University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Opinions

The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection

8-12-1941

Seeger v. Odell
Roger J. Traynor

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Seeger v. Odell 18 Cal.2d 409 (1941).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/34

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.

408

GUARDIANSHIP OF HUDELSON.

[18 C. (2d)

days subsequent to said ruling, we cannot assume that ap-'
pellant voluntarily included in this instrument an acknowledgment that the payments might be considered a charge
against her prospective share of this estate. However, it is
our opinion that appellant's first proposition is entirely without merit, for the court's written order expressing the inten,tion of this donor to create an advancement fully met the
requirements of section 1050. The incompetent not having
legal capacity to act for himself, the court acted for him, and
its order must be taken in lieu of the written expression of
the incompetent donor of his intention that these monthly
allowances shall be considered an advancement to appellant.
This conclusion is in complete accord with the general principle that the court, acting in equity for the protection of the
interests of the incompetent and after full consideration of
the evidence before it, is free to exercise its sound discretion
with reference to the disposition and management of the estate.
From these premises our decision must be that the court
had authority to allow these payments from the surplus income of the incompetent on condition that they "shall constitute an advance against any inheritance petitioner might
receive upon the death of her father."
The order is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., pro tem., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied August
28, 1941.
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NETTIE L. SEEGER et al., Appellants, v. A. tT. ODELL
. et al., Respondents.
[1] Pleading-Motions-For Judginent on Pleadings-Motion as
Admission.-On appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in'
favor of the defendant, the allegations of the complaint must
be considered true as though the complaint were before the
court upon a general demurrer.
[2a,2b] Cancellation - Actions - Pleading - Pleading Based on
Fraud.-A complaint states a cause of action to set aside a,
foreclosure sale, to rescind, and quiet title in plaintiff as
against an oil lease in which plaintiff joined, together with
an accounting of the profits where it alleges plaintiffs' execution of a note and mortgage on a lot, their reliance, after
foreclosure of a mortgage by certain defendants, on false
representations of their attorney as to a previous execution
sale of his lot to them and his consequent joinder in an oil
lease, the foreclosure sale of the property to one of the
defendants, the discovery of the falsity of the representations,
and excuse for delay in making it.
[3] Id.-Grounds-Fraud.-A person who has been induced by
fraudulent misrepresentations to enter into' a contrac,t or to
make a conveyance may have the contract or conveyance set
aside and secure a restitution of those benefits lost to him
by the transaction. (See Civ. Code, § 1689 (1);)
[4] Fraud-Representations-De:fl.nitions.-A fraudulent misrepresentation is one made with the knowledge that it is or may
be untrue, and with the intention that the person to whom
it is made act in reliance thereon. (See Civ. Code, §§ 1572,
1710.)
[5] Id.-Reliance on Representation-Necessity.-To be entitled
to relief from fraud it must appear not only that the plain-

McK. Dig. References: 1. Pleading, § 243 (1); 2. Cancellation
and Rescission, § 56; 3. Cancellation and Rescission, § 23; 4. Fraud
and Deceit, § 7; 5. Fraud and Deceit, §§ 22, 23; 6. Fraud and
Deceit, § 9 (6); 7. Fraud and Deceit, § 26;' 8. Torts, § 7; 9. Fraud
and Deceit, § 26 (1); 10, 12. Fraud and Deceit, § 27; 11. Fraud
and Deceit, § 9 (2); 13. Cancellation and Rescission, § 59; 14.
Cancellation and Rescission, §§ 11, 12, 14; 15. Equity, § 52; 16.
Cancellation and Rescission, § 16; 17, 18. Cancellation and Rescission, § 60.
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tiff acted in reliance on the misrepresentation,but that he
was justified in his reliance.
[6] Id. - Representations - Statements of Fact and OpinionQualifications of Rule.-A party may not justifiably rely upon
mere statements of opinion, including legal conclusions drawn
from a true state of facts, unless the person expressing the
opinion purports to have expert knowledge concerning the
matter or occupies a position of confidence and trust. If,
however, the opinion or legal conclusion misrepresents the
facts upon which it is based or implies the existence of facts
which are nonexistent, it constitutes an actionable misrepresentation.
[7a,7b] Id.-Reliance on Representation-Duty to Investigate.Negligence on the part of the plaintiff in failing to discover
the falsity of a statement is no defense when the misrepresentation was intentional rather than negligent. The fact
that an investigation would have revealed the falsity of the
misrepresentation will not alone bar recovery.
[8] Torts-Defenses-Negligence.-As a general rule negligence
of the plaintiff is no defense to an intentional tort.
[9] Fraud-Reliance on Representation-Duty to Oonsult Records.
The purpose of the recording acts is to afford protection not
to those who make fraudulent misrepresentations but to
bona fide purchasers for value. And the party to whom false
representations are made is not held to constructive notice
of a public record which would reveal the true facts.
[10] Id. - Reliance on Representation - Effect of KnowledgeStandard of Precaution and Minimum Knowledge.-A plaintiff. seeking relief from fraud is not held 'to the standard of
precaution or of minimum knowledge of a hypothetical, reasonable man. However, if the conduct of the plaintiff in the
light of his own intelligence and information was manifestly
unreasonable, he will be denied a recovery.
[11] Id. - Representations - Statements of Fact and OpinionI11ustrations-Execution-Levy and Sale.-A representation
that a levy of execution and sale of the property had occurred is a false' statement of fact, and' it is not rendered
less actionable because it also contains legal conclusions.
[12] Id. - Reliance on Representation - Effect of KnowledgeOwner's Title.-An owner of property is not conclusively
presumed to know the state of his own title, and is not
therefore precluded from relying upon misrepresentations as
to ownership. While situations might arise where the owner
would not be justified in relying upon such a misrepresenta6.
9.

See 12 Oal. Jur. 725 et seq.; 23 Am. Jur. 781.
See 12 Oal. Jur. 759, 761, 764; 23 Am. Jur. 972.
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tion, the circumstances of each case should determine whether
or not justification exists as in any other action based upon
fraud. (Robins v. Hope) 57 Cal. 493, overruled.)
[13] Oancellation-Actions-Pleading-Pleading Based on Fraud
-Damage.-In an action to set aside a foreclosure sale and to
rescind an oil lease on the ground of fraudulent misrepresentations, it is sufficient for the plaintiffs to allege that they
have been wrongfully deprived of certain property by reason
of the misrepresentations. They need not set forth in detuil the extent to which they have been damaged.
[14] Id.-Oonditions Precedent-Restitution-Application of and
Limitation on Rule;-Plaintiffs seeking to set aside a foreclosure sale and to rescind an oil lease upon the ground of
fraud must restore to the defendants any benefits which they
have received as a result of the transaction. They must,
therefore, pay to the mortgagee the amount of the mortgage
debt before they can recover the property. But since oil
royalties received by the plaintiffs are rightfully theirs, a
restoration thereof is not necessary..
[15] Equity-Pleading and Practice-Decree.-A court granting
equitable relief has the power to make its decrees contingent
upon compliance by the plaintiff with certain conditions.
[16] Oancellation-Oonditions Precedent-Restitution-Sufficiency
of Offer.-There is a sufficient offer of restitution where the
plaintiffs in their complaint offer to "do and perform all
things of them in equity required by the court to be done by
them in the premises" and to subtract the amount of the
mortgage debt from any sum awarded them from defendants.
[17] Id.-Actions-Pleading-Pleading Based on Fraud~Avoid
ance of Laches.-A plaintiff seeking relief on the ground of
fraud more than three years after the misrepresentation· must
allege facts showing that suit was brought within a reasonable
time after discovery of the fraud and without unnecessary
delay and that failure to make the discovery sooner was
not due to negligence.
.
[18] Id.-Actions-Pleading---:Pleading Based on Fraud-Avoidance of Laches-Application of Rule.-A complaint to set
aside a foreclosure sale and to rescind an oil lease brought
more than three years after the misrepresentations sufficiently
excuses delay where it alleges that the discovery did not occur
sooner because of plaintiffs' advanced age, the considerable
distance of the available records from their home, and the absence of any occasion on their part to examine the records
or otherwise inquire into the truth of the representations.
14.

See 4 Oal. Jur. 767; 120al. Jur. 781; 9 Am.. Jur. 385.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Orange County. Franklin G. West, Judge. Reversed.
Action to have a mortgage foreclosure sale set aside, to
rescind an oil lease, to quiet title to land in the plaintiffs
except as to certain subleases, and for moneys received by
plaintiffs' co lessor for oil royalties and by an o.il lessee fro.m
an oil well. Judgment on the pleadings for the defendants,
reversed.
Daniel A. Knapp and Fred A. Wilbur fo.r Appellants.
Louis N. Whealton, Wm. H. Neblett, B. H. Neblett and
E. Walter Guthrie for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-[l] Plaintiffs have appealed from a
judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendants A. J.
Odell, Mary Gibbs, William G. McAdoo and R.T. Colter.
The allegations o.f the complaint must therefore be considered true as tho.ugh the complaint were before the court upon
a general demurrer. (Miller v. Price, 103 Cal App. 650,
654 [284 Pac. 1035].)
[2a] The complaint alleges: The plaintiffs, an elderly
couple, were the owners of a lot located in Huntington Beach,
California. In 1926 they executed a note and mortgage on
this lot to William G. McAdoo and R. T. Colter as security
for the payment of a loan of $2255. McAdoo and Colter
assigned the note and mo.rtgage to Mary Gibbs who in 1933
secured a final judgment of foreclosure. Shortly thereafter,
A. J. Odell and Mary Gibbs requested the plaintiffs to confer
with them on the disposition of the property. At the conference McAdoo, Colter, Gibbs and Odell were represented
by their attorney, Ben H. Neblett. Neblett told plaintiffs
that as an attorney he had superio.r knowledge of many facts
concerning the land and that they could rely upon all he
had to say. l\1:cAdoo and Colter had previously secured a
money judgment against plaintiffs in another action, and
Neblett stated that, acting on behalf of Colter and McAdoo,
he had secured an execution on plaintiffs' land to satisfy the
judgment, that the sheriff had levied o.n the land and sold
it to' McAdoo and Colter for the amount of the judgment
debt, and that McAdoo and Colter were the owners of any

SEEGER V. ODELL.
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interest which plaintiffs previously had in the land. McAdoo
and Colter, he represented, were going to submit to the foreclosure sale, which had been set for August, 1933, and would
not exercise their equity of redemption. Neblett went on to
assure the plaintiffs, however, that he and his clients were
plaintiffs' friends and would make an unselfish proposal
solely to enable the plaintiffs to receive some return .from
the land out o.f which they would otherwise get nothing.
The proposal was that plaintiffs join with Mary Gibbs in a
leMe of the land to Odell for the purpose of drilling for oil,
with the understanding that they would receive a specific
royalty fro.m the oil produced.
The complaint further alleges: The plaintiffs believedNeblett's representation that their land had been sold at an
execution sale to Colter and McAdoo. They therefore joined
in executing a lease to Odell and made no attempt to. pay the
mo.rtgage debt or to exercise the equity of redemption after
the foreclosure sale although during this period many persons offered to lease the land from them with advances sufficient to· cover the mortgage indebtedness. After Mary Gibbs
bought in the property at the foreclosure sale in August,
1933, Odell took possession under his lease and· drilled a
well from which he has received profits of more than $100,000.
The complaint alleges ·,;Eurther: No execution actually had
been levied o.n the 'land: The representation that the land
had been sold to McAdoo and Colter was known to be false
by Neblett and his clients. It was made to induce the plaintiffs to refrain from paying the mortgage indebtedness or
from exercising their equity of redemptio.n and to induce
them to join in leasing the property to Odell. Plaintiffs did
not discover the falsity of the representatio.ns until May, 1936.
The records co.vering the facts involved were situated in a
city at some distance from the city where plaintiffs reside.
They are both elderly; neither drives an automobile, and
they had no reason to suspect that the representations were
false. Following the discovery of the misrepresentation,
plaintiffs no.tified Odell of their rescission of the lease. They
then brought this action against Odell, McAdoo, Colter, and
Gibbs asking that the foreclosure sale to Mary Gibbs be set
aside, that the title to the property be quieted in them except
as to existent subleases in the hands of innocent sublessees,
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and that a judgment be awarded them for all moneys received
as royalties by Mary Gibbs or her assigns from the oil well
and for all moneys received by Odell from the oil well.
Plaintiffs -offer to do all things required of them by the court
including the paying of the mortgage indebtedness on the
property. The oil companies were made nominal defendants solely to have their rights, if any, adjudicated.
[3] It is well established in California and other jurisdictions that a person who has been induced by fraudulent misrepresentations to enter into a contract or to make a conveyance may have the contract or conveyance set aside and secure
a restitution of those benefits lost to him by the transaction.
(Cal. Civ. Code, sec. 1689 (1); see cases cited in 12 Cal. Jur.
781, 782; 6 Cal. Jur. Supp. 54; Cal. A.nnotations to Rest.
Restitution, sec. 28. See Rest. Restitution, sec. 28.) [4]
A fraudulent misrepresentation is one made with the knowledge that it is or may be untrue, and with the intention that
the person to whom it is made act in reliance thereon. (Rest.
Torts, secs. 526, 531; Cal. Civ. Code, secs. 1572, 1710; see
cases cited in 12 Cal. Jur. 706-709. [5] It must appear,
however, not only that the plaintiff acted in reliance on the
misrepresentation but that he was justified in his reliance.
(Rest. Torts, sec. 537; see cases cited in 12 Cal. Jur. 750
et seq.) [6] He may not justifiably rely upon mere statements of opillion, including legal cQnclusions drawn from a
true state of facts (Rest. Torts, sec. 545; see cases cited in
12 Cal. Jur. 730-733, unless the person expressing the
opinion purports to have expert knowledge concerning the
l\Ilatter or occupies a position of confidence and trust. (Rest.,
Torts, sec. 542; see cases cited in 12 Cal. Jur. 725 et seq.)
If, however, the opinion or legal conclusion misrepresents
the facts upon which it is based or implies the existence of
facts which are nonexistent, it constitutes an actionable misrepresentation. (Rest. Torts, sec. 539; see cases cited in
12 Cal. Jur. 727, 728.) [7a] Negligence on the part of the
plaintiff in failing to discover the falsity of a statement is
no defense when the misrepresentation was intentional rather
than negligent. (See cases cited in 12 Cal. Jur. 758, 759;
Prosser, Torts, 748.) [8] As a general rule negligence of
the plaintiff is no defense to an intentional tort. (See Prosser, Torts, 402.) [7b,9] The fact that an investigation
would have revealed the falsity of the misrepresentation will

Aug. 1941.]
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not alone bar his recovery (Rest. Torts, sec. 540; see cases
cited in 12 Cal. Jur. 758, 759), and it is well established that
he is not-held to constructive notice of a public record which
would reveal the true facts. (Rest. Torts, sec. 540 (b); see
cases cited in 12 Cal. Jur. 759, 764; Prosser, Torts, 750, 751.)
The purpose of the recording acts is to' afford protection not
to those who make fraudulent misrepresentations but to bona
ji'de purchasers for value. [10] Nor is a plaintiff held to
the standard of precaution or of minimum knowledge of a
hypothetical, reasonable man. Exceptionally gullible or ignorant people have been permitted to recover from defendants who took advantage of them in circumstances where
persons of normal intelligence would not have been misled.
(See cases cited in 6 Cal. Jur. Supp. 45 (note 13) ; Prosser,
Torts, 749.) "No rogue should enjoy his ill-gotten plunder
for the simple reason that his victim is by chance a fooL"
(Chamberlin v. Fuller, 59 Vt. 247 [9 Atl. 832, 835].) If the
conduct of the plaintiff in the light of his own intelligence
and information was manifestly unreasonable, however, he
will be denied a recovery. (Rest. Torts, sec. 541; see cases
cited in 12 Cal. Jur. 757; Prosser, Torts, 747, 748.) "He
may not put faith in representations which are preposterous,
or which are shown by facts within his observation to be so
patently and obviously false that he must have closed his eyes
to avoid discovery of the truth. . . . " (Prosser, Torts, 749.)
[2b] In the present case the allegations of the plaintiffs'
complaint, if true, are sufficient to establish the right to relief on the basis of a fraudulent misrepresentation. According to these allegations the misrepresentation was ma.de by
the defendants through their agent (see cases cited in 12
Cal. Jur. 774; 6 Cal. Jur. Supp. 51) with the knowledge that
it was false and with the intention of inducing plaintiffs to
act in reliance upon it, and plaintiffs did act in reliance
thereon. The fact that an examination of the record would
have revealed to plaintiffs the falsity of the representation
or that they may have been negligent in failing to make
further investigations does not bar their right to relief. The
misrepresentation is not such that its falsity must have been
so obvious to _the plaintiffs as to preclude any justifiable reliance thereon by them. The defendants cannot -urge as a
defense that plaintiffs were more credulous than the average
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person. [11] The representation that a levy of execution
and sale of the property had occurred was a false statement
of fact and is not rendered less actionable because it also
contained legal conclusions.
[12] Defendants contend that under the case of Robins
v. 11 ope, 57 Cal. 493, an owner of property in California is
"conclusively presumed" to know the state of his own title
and therefore may not justifiably rely upon misrepresentations as to ownership. Since a "conclusive presumption" is
simply a statement of the rule of law applicable in a given
situation, defendants are contending for the establishment of
a rule that no action will lie for a fraudulent misrepresentation when it concerns the title to property owned by the party
misled. Such a rule would give legal sanction to the perpetration of fraud and permit the cunning to take unfair
advantage of the ignorant. The average property owner
knows nothing more about the state of his own title than that
it is presumably in himself. He usually purchases his property in reliance upon a policy of title insurance and does
not search the record for possible adverse claims. While
situations might arise where the owner of property would
not be jUstified in relying upon a misrepresentation as to its
title, the circumstances of each case should determine whether
or not justification exists as in any other action based upon
fraud. The defense should not be conclusively presumed
against the owner without giving him a chance to show justifiable reliance. Numerous cases in other jurisdictions have
permitted a vendor of realty to rescind a contract of sale
because the vendee had fraudulently misrepresented to the
vendor the value, quantity, or state of the title of the land
being conveyed. No attempt is made to presume, conclusively
or otherwise, knowledge by the ignorant vendor of the facts
concerning his m·Vn land. (Holt v. Gordon, (Tex. Civ. App.)
176 S. W. 902; Livingston v. Peru Iron 00., (N. Y.) 2 Paige,
390; Caples v. Steel, 7 Ore. 491; Crompton v. Beedle, 83 Vt.
287 [75 Atl. 331, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 399, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.)
748] ; Burrows v. Fitch, 62 W. Va. 116 [57 S. E. 283] ; Wilson
v. NichOlls, 72 Conn. 173 [43 Atl. 1052] ; Faxon v. Baldwin,
136 Iowa 519 [114 N. W. 401. See 9 A. L. R. 1062; 30
L. R. A. (N. S.) 753.) In the California case of Oonlan v.
Sullivan, 110 Cal. 624 [42 Pac. 1081], a vendee purchased
land from a vendor for far less than its value by concealing
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'from the vendor the fact that a mortgage with which the
vendor believed the land to be encumbered actually applied
to another piece of land. This court held that the fraudulent
'conduct of the vendee justified the trial court in rescinding
the contract of sale on behalf of the vendor. There was no
conclusive presumption against the vendor that he knew the
state of the title to his land. In the recent case of Glickman
v. N,ew York liife Insurance 00., 16 Cal. (2d) 626 [107 Pac.
(2d) 252, 131 A. L. R. 1292], this court held that the holder
of an insurance policy was not so chargeable with notice of
the terms of his policy as to be precluded from rescinding a
surrender of the policy when he was misled by fraudulent
statements as to his rights made by the insurer's agent. The
same considerations that prompted the court to refuse to
hold the policyholder to a knowledge of the terms of his
policy apply' against conclusively presuming knowledge of
the state of his title on the part of the owner of realty. The
case of Robins v. Hope is therefore overruled to the extent
that it holds that an owner of realty is conclusively presumed
to know the state of the title to his land.
[13] Because of the alleged fraudulent misrepresentation
:plaintiffs ask for a setting aside of the foreclosure sale to
Mary Gibbs and a rescission of the lease to Odell with an
accounting of the profits received by these defendants from
the property. Since the action is one for equitable relief,
rather than for damages at law, it is sufficient for the plaintiffs to allege that they have been wrongfully deprived ot
certain property by the misrepresentation and they need not
set forth in detail the extent to which they have been damaged. (See cases cited in 12 Cal. Jur. 813, 814.) [14] As
a condition of restitution, however, the plaintiffs must restore
to the defendants any benefits that they have received as a
result of the transaction. (Rest. Restitution, sec. 65; Civ.
Code, sec. 1691 (2); see cases cited in Cal. Annotations to
Rest. Restitution, sec. 65 ;12 Cal. Jur. 781.) Plaintiffs must
therefore pay to Mary Gibbs the amount of the mortgage debt
before they can recover the property. .A restoration of the
royalties received by plaintiffs is not necessary since they need
not restore property which is rightfully theirs. (See Rest.
Restitution, sec. 65, and Cal. Annotations.) [15] Defendants contend that plaintiffs have not properly offered to
make the necessary restitution. It is well established., how18 C. (2d)-14
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ever, that a court granting equitable relief has the power to
make its decrees contingent upon compliance by the plaintiff with certain conditions. ' (See cases cited in 10 Cal. Jur.
508-511, 512.) [16] The interests of the defendants can
thus be well protected by a decree'making any relief granted,
to plaintiffs conditional upon their paying the mortgage debt.
Plaintiffs' offer in their complaint to "do 'and perform all
things of them in equity required by the court to be done by
them in the premises" and to subtract the amount' of the
mortgage debt from any sum awarded them from Mary Gibbs
is a sufficient offer of restitution.
[17] Defendants finally contend that plaintiffs are barred
from a recovery by the statute of limitations and laches. In
California the statute of limitations in an action based upon
fraud begins to run from th.e time when the fraud was discovered or should reasonably have been discovered. (Code
Civ. Proc., sec. 338 (4).) It is necessary for a plaintiff
to allege facts showing that suit was brought within a reasonable time after discovery of the fraud without unnecessary delay and that failure to make the discovery sooner
was not due to negligence. (See cases cited in 12 Cal. Jur.
795-799.) [18] The present action was brought more than
three years after the date when the misrepresentation was
allegedly made but only sixty days after it was discovered.
Plaintiffs allege that the discovery did not occur sooner because of their advanced age, the considerable distance of the
available records from their home, and the absence of any
occasion on their part to examine the 'records or otherwise
inquire into the truth of the representation. The alleged
facts, if believed, would justify a trial court in finding that
the plaintiffs were sufficiently diligent in discovering the
fraud and that the action was brought within a reasonable
time thereafter.
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J.,Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Houser, J.,
and Carter, J., concurred.
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LOEW'S INCORPORATED (a Corporation) et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent.
[1] Literary Property-Right of First Publication-Publication as

Dedication.-Apart from statute, an author of an intellectual
right of first publication, which is' transproduction has
ferable, and which is entitled to the same protection as rights
in other species of property. But publication by the author
is a dedication to the public, which terminates the author's
exclusive right of property in the work.
[2] Copyright-Nature and Extent of Rights-Notice by Compliance With Statute.-In case of a literary work, there is
no right which can be protected under the,copyright law until
first pUblication. Upon first publication the right of exclusive property, that is, the right to multiply copies for a
limited period, is that afforded by the statute,whereas in
the case of an unpublished dramaticcomposition the statutory
right to exclusive performance or representation exists for
a limited period. Compliance with the statute to secure exelusive performance serves as constructive notice of the exelusive right and affords prima facie evidence of the facts
stated in the certificate of registration, and, therefore, of the
originality and innocence of the composition.
[3] Id.-Nonconcurrence of Statutory and Common-Law Rights-,Exclusiveness of Statutory Remedy.-The author of a dram,atic
composition who by compliance with the copyright law (17
U. S. C. A., § 11), has become the owner of a special statutory right, that is, the right to exclusive representation of
the composition for profit, is restricted to the statutory
remedies. The common-law right of exclusive representation
of an unpublished dramatic work exists until the statute
has been invoked and rights created thereunder, or it has
otherwise been abandoned. The common law and statutory
rights may not exist concurrently and an 'author who elects
to secure protection under the statute may not afterwards
make a different election.
[4] Id.-""::Infringement-Jurisdiction.-The superior court' is without jurisdiction over an action for damages for misappro-,
priation of a copyrighted dramatic publication predicated on

a

4. See 34 Am. Jur. 481.
McK. Dig. References: 1. Literary Property; 2-4. Copyright.

